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Case No. 20090148-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
JULLYN DOYLE, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for illegal possession or use of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2007), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37(a)-5(l) (West 2004). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue I. Whether the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to 
arrest judgment, rejecting her claims of prosecutorial misconduct for: (1) failing 
to correct allegedly false testimony concerning a plea agreement with a co-
defendant; and (2) failing to disclose the same information prior to trial, in 
violation of rule 16(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews the denial of such a motion for an 
abuse of discretion. See State v. Buck, 2009 UT App 2, 110, 200 R3d 674, cert, 
denied 2007 P.3d 432 (Utah 2009); State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264, ^ 10,167 
P.3d 516, cert, denied, 186 P.3d 957 (Utah 2008). 
Issue II. Whether the trial court properly admitted pursuant to rule 
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence of Defendant's 2006 DUI conviction, 
2007 DUI arrest, and statements and toxicology reports establishing Defendant's 
use of methamphetamine in both matters. 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit 
evidence under rule 404(b) for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Kooyman, 2005 
UT App 222, 115,112 P.3d 1252, cert, denied, 25 P.3d 102 (Utah 2005); State v. 
Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, % 12,57 P.3d 1139; see also State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 
60, f 42,28 P.3d 1278. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following rules are determinative of the issues herein. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404: 
Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; 
other crimes. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs 
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
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admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the 
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable 
notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial 
notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it 
intends to introduce at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charges. Defendant was charged by amended information with one 
count of illegal possession or use of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 287-88. 
Relevant Rule 404(b) Motions. Defendant moved preemptively to 
prevent the use at trial of prior bad act evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. R. 101-02. The State then filed a notice of intent to introduce at trial 
the following evidence under rule 404(b): 
• Defendant's 2006 DUI conviction for driving while under the influence of 
methamphetamine; 
• Defendant's admission during the 2006 DUI arrest that she had consumed 
meth; 
• A toxicology report from the 2006 DUI arrest showing meth in 
Defendant's system; and 
• A toxicology report from an August 2007 DUI arrest showing meth in 
Defendant's system. 
R. 105-10,241-42; R. 474:2-5; R. 478:17. The court heard argument, then denied 
Defendant's motion, finding all the evidence admissible under rule 404(b). R. 
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239-42 (Order on Defendant's Motion to Exclude Prior Bad Acts Evidence, 
attached in Addendum A). Defendant filed a petition seeking interlocutory 
review of the order, which this Court denied. R. 247,254. 
Defendant thereafter moved again to exclude evidence from the 2007 DUI 
arrest, which motion the court denied on the morning of the first day of trial. R. 
295-97, 311-12; R. 472: 3-4, 20-28. 
Discovery. Defendant filed several discovery requests prior to trial. R. 
14-16, 20-21, 45-46, 47-48. Specifically, she requested "[a] copy of any and all 
written or verbal offers to any co-defendant in this case in exchange for 
testimony against the Defendant7' and "[a] copy of any agreements made by any 
of the co-defendants to testify against Defendant in this case/7 R. 46. The State 
filed an initial response to this request on December 20, 2007, stating "To date, 
no offers have been made to any codefendants in exchange for testifying against 
this defendant.77 R. 193. 
In May 2008, the State entered into a plea bargain with Shantel Cuenca, a 
co-defendant in this case. R. 473:341-47. Cuenca had been charged with 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, a first-degree felony. 
R. 473:341-43. The State agree to amend the count to a second degree felony of 
possession of meth in a drug-free zone and to dismiss the remaining counts in 
that case in exchange for Cuenca7 s agreement to testify against Defendant. R. 
4 
473:341-44. In a second case, Cuenca was charged with three charges, the most 
serious of which was distribution of meth in a drlig-free zone with prior 
convictions, a first-degree felony that required a mandatory prison sentence. R. 
473:345-47. Cuenca again agreed to testify against Defendant in exchange for a 
plea of guilty to a charge of giving false information to a police officer, which 
allowed her to request probation at sentencing and obtain dismissal of the 
remaining charges. Id. 
The State thereafter filed a supplemental response to Defendant's 
discovery request, mistakenly stating that the request for information 
concerning plea agreements involved information that was "not discoverable/' 
R. 283, 464. Defendant did not seek an order compelling release of the 
information or otherwise objecting to the State's position. R. 464. 
Trial. On the first day of trial, the prosecutor called Cuenca, who testified 
that she watched Defendant smoking meth from a pipe being passed around by 
the people in the bedroom.1 R. 472:148-49,164-65. Thereafter, the prosecutor 
established that Cuenca had been convicted of possession with intent to 
distribute, both in this case and in another case. R. 472:457-58. The following 
exchange then occurred: 
1
 Cuenca had not previously mentioned that Defendant was smoking meth 
while in the bedroom that night. R. 472:168-69. 
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[Pros.] Okay. Were you ever given a deal on your charges for 
— in exchange for your testimony today? 
[Cuenca] No. 
Q. Has anyone ever asked you to testify in a specific way? 
A. No, I always told everybody I wouldn't lie. 
R. 472:158. On cross-examination, defense counsel pursued the matter further: 
[Def. CnsL] From this incident, you pled guilty, correct? 
[Cuenca] I did. 
Q. And it's your testimony that the State didn't offer you a deal 
to testify against Ms. Doyle? 
A. Nope. 
Q. You've been convicted since then? 
A. I have. 
Q. How many times -
A. Once. 
Q. - for felonies? How many? 
. . . [Tjhere's been three. 
Q. All right, and on — did you take deals on those, or did you 
take those to a trial like we're doing today? 
A. Nope, I'm on a five to life. 
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Q. So you actually took a deal, you plM guilty? 
A. Yeah, pled guilty to them. 
Q. All right, and the State didn't offer you a deal at that time? 
A. Nope. 
Q. Okay. So you're doing this just -4 why are you testifying 
today? 
A. Everyone's asking me to. 
R. 472:168-69. 
The following day, after the State had rested, defense counsel moved to 
dismiss the case, arguing that there was, in fact, a ple$ agreement between the 
State and Cuenca and that the prosecutor: (1) violated rule 16, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure by failing to inform Defendant prior to trial of the plea 
agreement; and (2) suborned perjury by failing to correct Cuenca's trial 
testimony concerning the plea agreement. R. 319-21; R. 473:304-22. After 
hearing argument and reviewing the written plea agreements, the trial judge 
denied the motion, finding: (1) there was no misconduct by the prosecutor; (2) 
the question of whether Cuenca had committed perjury was for the jury; and (3) 
Defendant could have discovered the plea arrangement herself. R. 473:320-22 
(attached in Addendum B). The judge expressly informed defense counsel that 
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he was free to impeach Cuenca with the plea agreements when the trial 
resumed. Id. 
Defendant thereafter called Cuenca's attorney, Gunda Jarvis, as a witness. 
R. 473:336-59. Ms. Jarvis testified in detail concerning the plea negotiations and 
the terms of the agreements reached between the State and her client. Id. She 
explained that if Cuenca "were to testify that she didn't receive any deal in 
exchange for her testimony against [Defendant], that would be false[.]" R. 
473:348. With the prosecutor's stipulation, defense counsel submitted as 
evidence the two written plea statements. R. 473:340-47, 357. 
Conviction. Following a two-day jury trial, Defendant was convicted as 
charged. R. 324-26, 351-52; R. 473: 414. Defendant then filed a motion to arrest 
judgment, making the same arguments concerning prosecutorial misconduct as 
she had presented in his earlier motion to dismiss. R. 374-95,465-66. The trial 
court denied the motion. R. 478: 7, R. 445-48, 461-66 (Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law & Order, attached in Addendum C). 
Sentencing, The trial court imposed and suspended an indeterminate 
prison term of zero to five years for the possession or use of a controlled 
substance conviction and imposed and suspended a jail term of 180 days for the 
possession of drug paraphernalia conviction. R. 445-48. The court placed 
Defendant on probation for 36 months and ordered her to serve 90 days in jail, 
& 
running the sentence consecutive with any other sentences Defendant was 
serving. Id. 
Notice of Appeal. Defendant timely appealed. R. 458-60. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Present Case, The Utah County Major Crimes Task Force executed a 
no-knock warrant on the home of Shantel Cuenca on June 28,2007. R. 472:146, 
176-80. After deploying two distraction devices, a SWAT team entered the 
trailer and secured the premises. R. 472:126,133,136,1$3. Of the approximately 
fourteen people in the trailer, one child was found alone in the living room, and 
Defendant, Cuenca, and two others were found in the back bedroom. R. 
472:134-35,143,147-49,159-60,187. 
Cuenca had called Defendant earlier that night tp come by the trailer and 
pick up Cuenca's daughter. R. 472:150,164,169. When Defendant arrived, she 
joined Cuenca, a girl named Nikki, and Jorge Lopez-Navarette in the bedroom. 
R. 472:147-48, 150, 169-70. Cuenca sold approximately 1.7 grams of 
methamphetamine to Nikki. R. 472:147,161-63. All four then smoked some 
meth using a pipe. R. 472:147-48,151,155,166. 
As the SWAT team entered the trailer, Cuencfa attempted to hide the 
contraband that was in her bedroom. R. 472:151-52,1|51. Officers entering that 
room were met by a wall of haze and smoke, and a chemical odor of freshly 
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burnt methamphetamine. R. 472:195-96. Their initial search of the room turned 
up meth in a Doritos bag, meth under Cuenca's mattress, meth in Cuenca's 
purse, and meth on Cuenca's nightstand. R. 472:152, 154,197. Officers also 
found two pipes and a plastic baggie containing meth. R. 472:188,198. The 
baggie was found on the floor between Defendant and Jorge and "within inches 
of [Defendant's] foot." R. 472:188,190; R. 473:246, 267. The Doritos bag was 
within Defendant's reach. R. 473:267. Cuenca claimed ownership of all of the 
drugs found in the trailer, except the baggie found near Defendant's feet. R. 473: 
246. A more thorough search of the bedroom revealed cash, a bong, and more 
meth. R. 473:262-63. Overall, officers found sixty grams of meth. R. 473:265. 
Officer John Barson attempted to interview Defendant later that night at 
Cuenca's home. R. 472:202-03. Defendant was "extremely confrontational," 
"verbally aggressive," "extremely physically agitated[,]" "very angry[,]" and 
generally "exhibited many of the symptoms . . . associated with 
methamphetamine use." R. 472:203-04; R. 473:240. The officer ultimately 
stopped the interview because Defendant was so hostile. R. 472:205. About 30 
minutes later, Defendant asked to speak to Officer Barson. R. 472: 205-06. She 
admitted that she knew there was meth in the bedroom and that they were 
preparing to smoke it. R. 472:206. 
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Prior Bad Acts. Officer Dennis Chapman arrested Defendant for DUI in 
2006. R. 473:270-71. The officer observed that she was nervous, twitching, 
shaking, and unable to sit still, causing him to suspect she had been using drugs. 
R. 473:272-73. When asked, Defendant admitted that she had recently taken 
meth, and that "she smoked meth whenever she got a chance." R. 473:273,275-
76. A blood test confirmed that she had meth in her system. R. 473:273-74. 
In August 2007, Defendant was again arrested for DUI. R. 109. A blood 
test showed meth in her system. R. 473:290-92. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I. This Court need not decide whether, as Defendant claims, the 
prosecutor knowingly used false testimony or failed to timely disclose the 
existence of the plea arrangement with Cuenca pursuant to rule 16, Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, because Defendant is not entitled to relief where she fails 
to establish the requisite prejudice. Counsel failed to follow up on the matter 
prior to trial when the prosecutor alerted him to the possible existence of a plea 
arrangement, he in fact discovered a plea arrangement immediately prior to 
trial, he called Cuenca's counsel as a witness to establish the existence and 
particulars of the arrangement, he admitted copies of the plea statements for the 
jury to review, and he vigorously argued in closing that the situation rendered 
Cuenca incredible. 
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Point II. Defendant's claim that the prior bad act evidence was 
inadmissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is without 
merit. The lower court properly recognized and applied the relevant three-step 
analysis, finding that the evidence relating to Defendant's 2006 and 2007 DUI 
arrests and her use of meth was offered for the proper noncharacter purpose of 
helping to establish that Defendant had the power and the intent to possess or 
use the meth and paraphernalia at issue. It established not only that she chose 
to use meth, but that she used it before and shortly after the charged incident, 
suggesting deliberate and habitual use. Hence, the evidence was relevant. 
Moreover, the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed 
by any danger of unfair prejudice where the evidence was exceedingly strong, 
was necessary to the State's constructive possession case, and was not the sort to 
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility toward Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO RELIEF IS WARRANTED WHERE THE RECORD CLEARLY 
DEMONSTRATES THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT 
PREJUDICED BY THE ALLEGEDLY FALSE TESTIMONY 
Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted her motion to 
arrest judgment because prosecutorial misconduct denied her a fair trial. See Br. 
of Aplt. at 13,15. She argues that the prosecutor not only offered, but "relied on 
12 
. . . and failed to correct" false testimony from Shantel Cuenca concerning the 
existence of a plea agreement. Id. at 15-19. She summarily claims that there is "a 
reasonable likelihood that the judgment of the jury c0uld be affected" by the 
false testimony and that the prosecutor's misconduct, combined with his failure 
to inform Defendant of the existence of the plea agreement prior to trial, 
"substantially impaired" her right to a fair trial and warrants reversal of her 
convictions. Id. at 15-25. 
The trial court declined to arrest judgment, finding that 
-Defendant was put on notice of a possible plea deal but failed to address 
the matter before trial; 
-any error in the State's failure to provide the plea information prior to 
trial was cured by defendant's thorough exploration into the plea deal in 
the course of the trial; and 
-the State did not suborn perjury where Cuenca "may have believed she 
did not receive a plea deal" because she pled| guilty to a first degree 
felony and was actually sentenced to prison for it.2 
Add. Cat 3-5. 
2
 The court explained that Cuenca had been charged with a first degree 
felony in one case and had ultimately pled guilty to a first degree felony in 
another. R. 463. The plea agreement resulted in disn^issal of a drug-free zone 
enhancement, which removed the penalty of a mandatory five years to life and 
allowed Cuenca to request probation at sentencing. See Add. A at 4-5. 
However, the judge sentenced her to five years to life in prison for the first 
degree felony. Id. Hence, the court noted, Cuenca njay not have believed she 
received a deal under the agreement. Id. 
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This Court need not decide whether the prosecutor knowingly used false 
testimony or failed to timely disclose the existence of the plea agreement 
because, even assuming as much, the trial court correctly found no prejudice 
where Defendant not only knew of the relevant information, but "thoroughly 
explored" it during trial. Add. C at 3-4. 
"It is undisputed that a criminal conviction procured by the knowing use 
of false testimony is fundamentally unfair" and violative of the due process 
clauses of the federal and state constitutions. State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 24 
(Utah 1984); Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1981); State v. Gordon, 886 
P.2d 112,115-16 (Utah App. 1994). However, relief is not warranted unless 
there is a "'reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 
judgment of the jury/" Gordon, 886 P.2d at 116 (quoting Walker, 624 P.2d at 690); 
see also Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 24. 
Similarly, "a breach of discovery rules does not warrant reversal absent a 
showing of prejudice to the defendant." State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 807 (Utah 
1993) (citation omitted); see also State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,274-75 (Utah 1998) 
("Unless a review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong 
in that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, we will not find that 
. . . the court's decision was an abuse of discretion.") (quotations and citations 
omitted). Moreover, unless or until "defendant can make a credible argument 
14 
that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense," the burden never shifts 
to the State to show "that there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the error, 
the outcome of trial would have been more favorable fdr the defendant." State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 921 (Utah 1987). A "mere possibility" of a different 
outcome is not sufficient: rather, "the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." Id. at 920. 
In this case, Defendant is unable to make the requisite showing of 
prejudice to warrant relief either for prosecutorial misconduct or for a discovery 
violation. She argues that she was prejudiced by the prosecutor's conduct 
because Cuenca's "false statements could have affected the judgment of the 
jury" given "the nature of [her] testimony [.]" Br. of A^lt. at 24-25. Her claim is 
wholly without merit, however, because the record demonstrates that Cuenca's 
plea-related statements were fully explained, evaluated, and argued by the 
parties during the trial, alleviating any possible prejudice that may have 
otherwise arisen from the testimony. 
Defense counsel became concerned about Cuenca's testimony when he 
discovered just prior to trial that she would testify foit the State. R. 473:310-11, 
318. He immediately investigated her criminal history and located one of her 
plea agreements. R. 473:310-11,318-19. Cuenca testified on direct examination 
that she had not been given a deal in exchange for her testimony. R. 472:158; R. 
15 
473:309-10. On cross-examination, defense counsel repeatedly asked her 
whether she had received a plea deal, but her testimony did not change. R. 
472:166; R. 473:311, 319. 
The following day, defense counsel put the attorney who negotiated 
Cuenca's plea deal, Gunda Jarvis, on the stand to testify extensively regarding 
the facts and conditions surrounding the plea deal. R. 473:321,336-59. Defense 
counsel introduced into evidence, with the State's stipulation, both written plea 
statements from Cuenca's criminal cases. R. 473:357. Both sides thereafter 
argued the evidence in closing, with the prosecutor acknowledging the plea 
agreements and explaining how Cuenca may have believed that she did not get 
a deal, while defense counsel took the opportunity to use the evidence to 
impeach Cuenca.3 R. 473:388-89,407-09. 
Consequently, the jury had before it all the relevant information 
concerning Cuenca's testimony, including the written plea agreements, prior to 
deliberations. While the prosecutor could have acted more quickly to clarify 
Cuenca's initial testimony, both parties together effectively removed any 
possible misunderstanding about the value of any plea deal. The jurors could 
have had no doubt about the existence of the plea agreements, and they were 
3
 The prosecutor never argued to the jury that there were no plea 
agreements in place. 
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fully able to use the details of those agreements to determine the weight and 
credibility of Cuenca's testimony. See Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25; Gordon, 886 P.2d at 
116 n.9. In the end, they convicted Defendant as charged. Hence, she was not 
entitled to an arrest of judgment, and the lower court dici not abuse its discretion 
in denying her motion. See Gordon, 886 P.2d at 116-17 (where the false testimony 
was effectively corrected by the parties at trial, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in so holding); see also Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25 (where the defendants7 
counsel recognized the problem with the testimony aftd conducted extensive 
cross-examination about it, "[defendants were not in any way prejudiced[,]" 
and it was properly left to the jury to determine the weight and credibility of the 
testimony). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
CHALLENGED EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT TO A 
MATERIAL ISSUE AND THAT ITS PROBATIVE VALUE WAS 
NOT SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY THE POTENTIAL 
FOR UNFAIR PREJUDICE 
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its jiiscretion by ruling that 
the State could use the following evidence at trial: 
1. A 2006 DUI conviction in which Defendant was found to have 
been driving under the influence of methamphetamine; 
2. Defendant's admissions during the 2006 DUI arrest that she had 
consumed methamphetamine; 
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3. The toxicology report from the 2006 DUI arrest that showed 
methamphetamine in Defendant's system; and 
4. The toxicology report from an August 2007 DUI arrest that 
again showed methamphetamine in Defendant's blood. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 25-30; Add. A at 2-3. She claims that the evidence was 
admitted solely to establish her propensity to commit meth-related offenses, and 
that, in any event, any probative value in the prior bad acts evidence was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Br. of Aplt. at 
28-30. The trial court properly admitted the evidence. 
A. Rule 404(b) Analysis 
A trial court's admission of evidence under rule 404(b) is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. See State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222,115,112 P.3d 1252, 
cert, denied, 125 P.3d 102 (Utah 2005); State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, \ 12,57 
P.3d 1139. So long as evidence is offered for "a proper, non-character purpose" 
it is presumptively admissible. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, f^ 18-19 (citing State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f 18, 6 P.3d 1120, cert, denied, 221 P.3d 837 (2009). 
The admissibility of prior bad acts under rule 404(b) turns on a three-step 
analysis. See Order at 2; see also State v. MarcM, 2009 UT App 262, f 29,219 P.3d 
75; see also Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ^ 18-20. First, the evidence must be 
"offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as one of those specifically 
listed in rule 404(b)." Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, If 18. However, the list of 
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noncharacter purposes in the rule "is not exhaustive[.] See State v. Allen, 2005 
UT11, f 17,108 P.3d 730, cert, denied, 546 U.S. 832 (Utah 2005), reh'g. denied, 546 
U.S. 1082 (2005). Bad acts evidence is admissible undef this first prong so long 
as it is relevant to show something other than Defendant's bad character. Id. at 
f 24. When prior bad act evidence establishes an eleitient of the crime and is 
directly probative of a disputed issue, it may be admipsible even if it tends to 
prove that Defendant has committed other crimes. State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5 
(Utah 1990); see also State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192,195 '(Utah 1985), cert, denied, 
479 U.S. 813 (1986) (evidence of prior crimes is admissible if the evidence is 
relevant to prove a specific element of the crime for Which a Defendant is on 
trial; the evidence is not admissible if it is relevant solely to show a Defendant's 
propensity to commit a crime). 
Second, the bad acts evidence must "mee[t] the requirements of rule 402." 
Marcliet, 2009 UT App 262, |^f 29,43; see also Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f 19 
(citing Utah R. Evid. 402). "Under rule 402, all relevant evidence is admissible 
except as otherwise provided in the rules." State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^ 41, 
28 P.3d 1278. Relevant evidence is "'evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.'" Nelson-
Waggoner, 2000 UT 59,119 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 40}). 
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Third, prior bad acts evidence must meet "the requirements of rule 403." 
Id. at T[20 (citing Utah R. Evid. 403). Rule 403 excludes relevant evidence "if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence/" Utah R. 
Evid. 403. 
In sum, Defendant must establish that the trial court abused its discretion 
in determining that, under the facts of this case, the challenged evidence was 
relevant to a proper, noncharacter purpose, and that its probative value was not 
substantially outweighed by any potential for unfair prejudice. See Widdison, 
2001UT 60, If 41 (citing State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f f 20-23,993 P.2d 837, cert 
den'd 528 U.S. 1164 (2000)). 
B, The Evidence is Admissible Under Rule 404(b) to Establish 
Defendant's Constructive Possession of the Meth and 
Paraphernalia 
Probativeness. The lower court analyzed the prior acts evidence using 
the appropriate three-step analysis. First, the court determined that the 
evidence was admissible for, among other things, the proper noncharacter 
purposes offered by the prosecutor: to "show ownership or possession of the 
methamphetamine found in this case, [and] to establish that the items found 
with the drugs are in fact drug paraphernalia . . . . " Add. A. at 2; R. 474:6-8. 
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Defendant argues that the purposes identified by the trial court are not 
valid because the nature of the items as drug paraphernalia was not at issue, 
and ownership or possession are not appropriate purposes under rule 404(b). 
Br. of Aplt. at 28. Instead, she contends, the evidence serves only to suggest 
that, on this occasion, she "acted in conformity" with the prior occasions, "in 
direct violation of Rule 404(b)." Id. 
By pleading not guilty, "defendant put every element of the charge 
against [her] in issue." State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 927 (UT App. 1994) 
(citation omitted) (permitting use of prior bad act evidence that was relevant to 
an element of the charged crime), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Doporto, 
935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997), reh'g denied, (Mar. 24, 1997). Defendant was not 
charged with simply being in the same room with the methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia. Rather, she was charged with constructive possession of those 
items. That required the State to establish the existence of "a sufficient nexus 
between the accused and the drug [and paraphernalia] to permit an inference 
that the accused had both the power and the intent td exercise dominion and 
control over the drug [and paraphernalia].'" State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ^ f 31, 
122 P.3d 639 (quoting State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985)) (bracketed 
information added). Defendant acknowledged this burden below, urging the 
jury to find that the State had not met it. R. 473:399. 
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With Defendant's possession, intent, and use of the meth and 
paraphernalia at issue below, the State appropriately looked to Defendant's 
prior use of meth to help establish these elements. See Allen, 2005 UT 11, \L7 
(the list of noncharacter purposes in rule 404(b) "is not exhaustive[.]"J. See, e.g., 
Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 32 (in a constructive possession case, the required nexus 
may be established by means of a number of different factors, including, where 
appropriate, "previous drug use"); Teuscher, 883 P.2d at 926-27; State v. Taylor, 
818 P.2d 561,570-71 (Utah App. 1991) (Defendant's prior possession of the same 
drug packaged in the same manner as the drugs charged at present "was 
particularly probative on the issue of constructive possession" and crucial to the 
State's case against Defendant), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Doporto, 935 
P.2d 484 (Utah Jan. 17,1997), reliearing denied, (Mar 24,1997). Although such 
evidence would be inadmissible to establish her propensity to use meth, it was 
offered and admitted for the alternative noncharacter purpose of helping to 
establish the contested issue of whether she possessed, used, or intended to use 
the meth and paraphernalia in this case. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b); State v. Bisner, 
2001 UT 99, If 57,37 P.3d 1073; Taylor, 818 P.2d at 570-71. Most of the evidence 
established that sometime within the eighteen months preceding the instant 
raid, Defendant had admitted to police officers that she had been using meth, 
she had tested positive for meth use, and she was convicted of driving while 
22 
under the influence of meth. See Add. A at 1-2. Defendant's 2007 DUI arrest 
came within weeks of the raid in this case and generated a toxicology report 
demonstrating additional meth use. See Br. Aplt at 25. Together, the evidence 
suggests not only that Defendant had a drug habit, but an active meth habit 
around the time of the raid in this case, and that her use of the drug was 
deliberate or intentional as opposed to mistaken or accidental. Such evidence 
suggests that she is likely to have possessed, used or intended to use the items in 
the bedroom. Further, it negates any claim that Defendant's prior use of 
methamphetamine ended before the instant raid. See Taylor, 818 P.2d at 570, n.8 
(noting that evidence was probative where it tended to negate a claim that 
someone other than Defendant possessed the drugs). Consequently, the trial 
court appropriately determined that the evidence was offered for a proper 
noncharacter purpose. See Add. A at 2; Workman, 2005 UT 66, ^ 31-32. 
Relevance. Further, the evidence was relevant where the fact of 
Defendant's meth use as well as the timing of that use tended to make it more 
probable that Defendant possessed, used, or intended to use the charged items. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 401; see Bisner, 2001 UT 99, | 58. The relevance of the 
evidence was strengthened by Defendant's 2006 admission that she "smoked 
meth whenever she got a chance" because she "couldn't afford to purchase meth 
on her own[.]" R. 473:273. Her statement is relevant because it makes it more 
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likely that she intended to use the meth and paraphernalia. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
401. The evidence also negates any claim that Defendant's meth use ended prior 
to the charged incident, again strengthening the State's constructive possession 
claim. SeeR. 473:329. 
Prejudice versus Probativeness. Finally, prior bad acts evidence must 
meet "the requirements of rule 403." Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f 20; 
Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, f f 29,43. Rule 403 excludes relevant evidence "if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. 
Evid. 403. In assessing whether bad acts evidence is admissible under rule 403, 
a variety of matters, commonly known as the "S/zzdcZes factors/' must be 
considered, including 
"[1] the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other 
crime, [2] the similarities between the crimes, [3] the interval of 
time that has elapsed between the crimes, [4] the need for the 
evidence, [5] the efficacy of alternative proof, and [6] the degree to 
which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility." 
Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, % 44 (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 
(Utah 1988)). 
However, of the six factors, Defendant points only to three, arguing that 
the lack of similarities between the instant case and the prior acts, the interval of 
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time between the acts, and the tendency of the prior bad acts to rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility towards her combine to establish that the evidence 
carries a danger of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs any probative 
value it may have. See Br. of Aplt. at 29. To the contrary, a review of the 
entirety of the Shickles factors supports the trial court's determination that "the 
probative value of the evidence outweighs any unfair prejudicial effect/' Add. 
A at 3; R. 474:11-12. 
The evidence of the prior acts is exceedingly strong, consisting of a 
conviction, an admission, and two toxicology reports. 
The prior acts share two similarities with this case: Defendant and her use 
of meth. Both are extremely important in light of the State's constructive 
possession claim involving meth. The absence of additional similarities does not 
necessarily render the prior acts less relevant. See Workman, 2005 UT 66, f f^ 31-
32. 
The interval of time weighs in favor of admission where the evidence of 
Defendant's meth use sixteen months prior to the instafit matter and eight short 
weeks afterward suggests an on-going meth habit that supports the State's case. 
Further, the passage of sixteen months does not dirtninish the relevance of 
Defendant's 2006 admission that she "smoked meth whenever she got a chance" 
because she "couldn't afford to purchase meth on her own[.]" R. 473:273. The 
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circumstances of the meth use in this case present just such an opportunity for 
Defendant. 
The need for the evidence is great inasmuch as Defendant's meth use is 
highly probative of the charged crime and essential to a case built largely on 
circumstantial evidence. See State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1309 (Utah 1986) 
(evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible where it is crucial to a 
case built primarily on circumstantial evidence); Taylor, 818 P.2d at 570-71. 
Nothing in the record or in Defendant's brief suggests that there is any 
better or more effective alternative proof regarding the likelihood that she 
constructively possessed the meth and paraphernalia. 
Finally, it is unlikely that evidence of the prior acts roused the jury to 
overmastering hostility toward Defendant. The prior acts involved no 
discernible victim other than Defendant, were not unduly emphasized, and 
were not the only evidence pertaining to Defendant's use of drugs—even one of 
Defendant's own witnesses discussed Defendant's drug use. See R. 472: 147, 
151, 155, 159, 166; R. 473:240, 329. Even the mere fact that Defendant drove 
while under the influence of meth, without more, seems highly unlikely to 
inspire "overmastering hostility." See Alien, 2005 UT11, f 33. Hence, while the 
evidence is admittedly prejudicial to Defendant, it is also highly probative of the 
charged offenses. 
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Given the lower court's appropriate application of the three-step analysis 
and the absence of any likelihood of unfair prejudice, the evidence was 
admissible under rule 404(b), and the trial court's ruling does not represent an 
abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's 
convictions.
 y 
Respectfully submitted this $0 day of April, 2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
ICRIS LEONARD 
Assistant Attorhey General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
JULLYN DOYLE, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO EXCLUDE PRIOR BAD ACTS 
EVIDENCE 
Case No. 071402824 
Judge Darold J. McDade 
This matter comes before the Court on the defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Prior 
Bad Acts. Having been fully briefed and argued before the Court, the Motion is ripe for decision. 
The State put the defendant on notice that it intends to introfjuce the following bad acts 
evidence under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 404(b) at trial: 
1. A 2006 DUI conviction wherein the defendant was convicted of driving while 
under the influence of methamphetamine. 
2. Statements made by the defendant when she was arrested in 2006 for DUI to the 
effect that she had consumed methamphetamine. 
? 
^ 
3. Toxicology report from the 2006 DUI arrest showing the presence of 
methamphetamine in the defendant's blood. 
4. Toxicology report from an August 2007 arrest for DUI, showing the presence of 
methamphetamine in the defendant's blood. 
The defendant moved to exclude such evidence claiming the evidence is improper under Rule 
404(b). 
"In deciding whether evidence of other crimes is admissible under rule 404(b), the trial 
court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, non-character 
purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3) 
whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State v. Cox, 169 P.3d 806, 813 
(Utah Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). 
The Court denies the defendant's motion based upon the following: 
The State is not seeking to introduce the evidence of other bad acts to establish character 
that conforms with the actions alleged in the current case. Rather, the State is seeking to 
introduce such evidence for non-character purposes-i.e., to show ownership or possession of the 
methamphetamine found in this case, to establish that the items found with the drugs are in fact 
drug paraphernalia (as expressly allowed by statute), and other non-character purposes. 
The evidence proposed by the State is clearly relevant under Rule 402 because it tends to 
make the existence of a fact of consequence in this matter-the possession or ownership of the 
drugs-more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See URCrP 401. 
? 
Finally, the probative value of the evidence outweighs any unfair prejudicial effect. The 
Court notes that all the evidence the State will submit against the defendant is prejudicial, but 
Rule 403 only excludes "unfair prejudice." The Court finds that the evidence is not unfairly 
prejudicial and is therefore proper. 
Therefore, the Court DENIES the defendant's motion to exclude the prior bad acts 
mentioned in this order and the State may introduce the same at trial. 
Dated this day: } - i v ;.."* P's >a<%S -
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1 pled down from a first-degree. I was able to see that last 
2 night, and see what was there, what charges were there. 
3 Ludicrous to assert that I'm trying to — or seem 
4 to assert that I'm trying to give you false information by 
5 only giving you one plea agreement. This plea agreement that 
6 they've given, what does it say? The State agrees to amend 
7 Count I. It's amended. Obviously it's a lesser charge. 
8 "I will plead to Count III." The remaining counts will be 
9 dismissed. "The State agrees to recommend that we proceed 
10 with sentencing today." State allowed her to be sentenced 
11 then. "I agree to testify against Jullyn Doyle," May 5th, same 
12 date. Testimony changed. 
13 It can't be any clearer. Whether or not she understood 
14 it, I'm ready to call Ms. Jarvis, and I request to call her. 
15 The jury clearly heard, though, clearly heard from Ms. Cuenca, 
16 "I'm here of my own free will and choice. I'm just a good 
17 citizen and I'm telling you that Jullyn Doyle smoked meth," 
18 change of testimony. "No State didn't give me a deal for 
19 this." 
20 These documents prove otherwise. They prove otherwise 
21 that she was given a deal in exchange to testify against Jullyn 
22 Doyle. How much clearer can it be? Request to be able to call 
23 Ms. Jarvis to the stand to testify. 
24- THE COURT: You can call Ms. Jarvis when the jury comes 
25 back in. That's your case, not before me. If you want to 
-321-
1 impeach Ms. Cuenca, you need to do that in front of the jury — 
2 MR. DODD: I — 
3 THE COURT: — not before the Court. 
4 MR. DODD: -- certainly request that, your Honor, but 
5 the State is alleging that somehow Cuenca didn't think she was 
6 getting a deal. I'd like to call Ms. Jaryis to be able to 
7 testify of what she does — 
8 THE COURT: You can do --
9 MR. DODD: — with every one of her clients. 
10 THE COURT: — that before the jury. You're asking me 
11 to make a finding of fact in a case that the jury hasn't heard 
12 your side. 
13 MR. DODD: No, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: As far as the argument you're making — 
15 MR. DODD: I'm asking you — 
16 THE COURT: — if you want to impeach Ms. Cuenca, you 
17 need to do it in front of the jury. 
18 MR. DODD: I'm not asking to impeach Ms. Cuenca. 
19 I'm asking to present evidence to this Court that there was 
20 perjury. 
21 THE COURT: I don't find misconduct on the part of the 
22 State, number one. Whether or not she committed perjury is an 
23 issue for the jury to hear. You made your arguments. That's 
24 my finding. As far as discovery goes, you have that ability, 
25 as well as the State, to pick up discovery. That's the bottom 
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1 line. 
2 Your motion, I read through it carefully. I read the 
3 case. The case involved a post conviction motion. The whole 
4 case hadn't been tried. This is different. You're bringing in 
5 this motion in the middle of the case. If you want to impeach 
6 Ms. Cuenca, do it in front of the jury. They're the finders of 
7 fact. 
8 MR. DODD: Your Honor, in the alternative I'll move for 
9 a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct. 
10 THE COURT: Denied. 
11 MR. DODD: Thank you. 
12 THE COURT: You motion to dismiss is also denied. 
13 MR. DODD: Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: Do we need to take a break, or do we need 
15 to — how many -- can you present your next witness, Mr. Dodd, 
16 within the next 40 minutes? Can we get that done before we 
17 take a lunch break, or do you need — should we just take a 
18 lunch now and come back? 
19 MR. DODD: I think we should take a lunch break now. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. PETERS: I would request the same. 
22 THE COURT: All right. We'll go ahead and recess, 
23 then, for lunch. Let's return at — is 1 o'clock enough time 
24 for everybody? 
2 5 MR. DODD: Yes. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JULLYN DOYLE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW & ORDER 
Case No. 071402824 
JUDGE Darold J. McDade 
This case is before the Court on the defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. Aaron Dodd 
represented the defendant and Timothy Taylor represented the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 24 and 25, 2008? a jury trial was held wherein the defendant was 
convicted of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. 
2. On or about November 17, 2008, prior to the imposition of a sentence, the defendant 
filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment. The defendant invoked two separate arguments in favor of his 
Motion to Arrest Judgment: 1) That the State of Utah failed to provide exculpatory evidence after 
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the defendant had filed a Specific Request for Discovery inquiring into any plea deals with the 
co-defendant in the case, and; 2) that the State of Utah suborned perjury by failing to correct 
alleged false testimony by a co-defendant. 
3. On or about December 10, 2008, the State of Utah filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
4. On or about December 19, 2008, the defendant filed a Reply to State's Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
5. On or about December 29, 2008, the State filed a Supplemental Memorandum in 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
6. On January 12, 2009, the court received oral arguments from the parties. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
After reviewing the aforementioned documents and receiving arguments from the parties, 
the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
1. The Court finds that on or about November 15, 2007, the defendant filed a Specific 
Request for Discovery asking the State to provide a copy of any agreements between the State 
and the co-defendants in exchange for testifying against the defendant. At this point in the 
proceedings, the State responded indicating, "To date, no offers have been made to any co-
defendants in exchange for testifying against this defendant." 
2. On or about May 5, 2008, Shantel Cuenca "Cuenca", a co-defendant in the present 
case, pled guilty in two unrelated cases. In case 081401078, Cuenca plead guilty to Distribution 
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of a Controlled Substance with Prior Convictions, a first degree felony and False Information to a 
Peace Officer, a class C misdemeanor. In case number 081401181, Cuenca pled guilty to 
Possession of a Controlled Substance in Drug Free Zone, a second degree felony. As part of this 
plea deal, Cuenca agreed to "testify against Jullyn Doyle and Jorge Navarrette-Lopez." Cuenca 
waived time for sentencing and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison with the aforementioned 
cases running concurrently with each other. 
3. On or about September 12, 2008, the State filed a Supplemental Response to 
Defendant's Specific Request for Discovery as it related to any possible plea deal with the co-
defendant. In part, the State indicated, "The State objects to this request due to the fact that the 
items requested are not discoverable." The defendant did not object; to the State's response 
neither did it seek the State to compel with its discovery request. 
4. The Court finds that upon receiving the State's objection to provide discovery, the 
defendant could have objected or filed a Motion to Compel in order to discover the details of any 
possible plea deal between Cuenca and the State. Therefore, the defendant was put on notice by 
the State of a possible plea deal with Cuenca but the defendant failed to further address this issue 
before the trial began. However, the Co art also finds that any failure by the State to provide 
information regarding a plea deal with the co-defendant was cured when defense counsel 
thoroughly explored the details of Cuenca's plea deal during the trial by examining both Cuenca 
and the Cuenca's legal counsel in front of the jury. 
5. This Court specifically finds support for its decision in the case of State v. Bisner, 37 
P.3d 1073, (Utah 2001). In this case the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
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Despite the strictures imposed on prosecutors by this constitutional 
duty of disclosure, the United States Supreme Court has held that it is 
in the specific instance where there is discovery after trial, of 
information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to 
the defense that reversal of a conviction for nondisclosure is required. 
Accordingly, courts universally refuse to overturn convictions where 
the evidence at issue is known to the defense prior to or during trial, 
where the defendant reasonably should have known of the evidence, 
or where the defense had the opportunity to use the evidence to its 
advantage during the trial but failed to do so. 
Id. at 1082-83. (emphasis in original). 
Since the defendant learned of a possible plea deal before trial but also thoroughly 
examined the details of the plea deal during the trial, this Court finds the State of Utah did not 
fail to provide the defendant with exculpatory evidence and the defendant's due process rights 
wrere not violated. 
6. The Court finds that the case of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), is 
distinguishable to the case at hand due to the fact that the defendant in Napue did not discover 
exculpatory evidence known by the prosecutor until after the case was completed. Therefore, the 
Court finds that Napue is not controlling based on the facts in the present case. 
7. The Court also finds that the State did not suborn perjury. "Perjury" is a "false material 
statement under oath or affirmation or swears or affirms the truth of a material statement 
previously made and he does not believe the statement to be true." Utah Code Ann. §76-8-502. 
8. Shantel Cuenca was charged with a first degree felony and ultimately ended up 
pleading to a first degree felony. The difference between the original charge and her plea was the 
dismissal of a drug free zone which removed the penalty from a mandatory 5 years to life to a 
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penalty of not less than 5 years to life. The Court finds that when Cuenca indicated she did not 
receive a plea deal in exchange for her testimony, she may have believed she actually did not 
receive a plea deal since she was still sentenced 5 years to life at the Utah State Prison. Since 
Cuenca may have believed she did not receive a plea deal, the Court cannot conclude that the 
State suborned perjury. 
ORDER 
Based on the aforementioned findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court finds 
there is not a good cause to arrest judgment pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and the defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment is hereby DENIED. 
Aaron P. Dodd 
Attorney for Defendant 
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